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Abstract—Biometrics and biometric-enabled decision support
systems (DSS) have become a mandatory part of complex
dynamic systems such as security checkpoints, personal health
monitoring systems, autonomous robots, and epidemiological
surveillance. Risk, trust, and bias (R-T-B) are emerging measures
of performance of such systems. The existing studies on the R-T-B
impact on system performance mostly ignore the complementary
nature of R-T-B and their causal relationships, for instance, risk
of trust, risk of bias, and risk of trust over biases. This paper
offers a complete taxonomy of the R-T-B causal performance
regulators for the biometric-enabled DSS. The proposed novel
taxonomy links the R-T-B assessment to the causal inference
mechanism for reasoning in decision making. Practical details
of the R-T-B assessment in the DSS are demonstrated using the
experiments of assessing the trust in synthetic biometric and
the risk of bias in face biometrics. The paper also outlines the
emerging applications of the proposed approach beyond biomet-
rics, including decision support for epidemiological surveillance
such as for COVID-19 pandemics.
Keywords: Risk, trust, bias, biometrics, intelligent decision
support, Bayesian causal inference, machine reasoning, epi-
demiological surveillance.
I. INTRODUCTION
B iometric-enabled decision support is a mandatory mech-anism of various complex systems, such as:
− security checkpoints (identity management) [1],
− personal health monitoring systems [2],
− e-coaching for health [3],
− driver assistant (e.g., fatigue and stress detection) [4],
− multi-factor authentication systems [5],
− spoken conversational agents [6],
− epidemiological surveillance [7] and,
− preparedness systems for emerging health service [8].
To be integrated into a complex system, a biometric-enabled
computational intelligence (CI) must satisfy various require-
ments for compatibility and standards. In other words, it must
adhere to the concept of Decision Support System (DSS).
Generally, the goal of any DSS is to support human experts,
operators, or users in their decision-making in real-time, under
multiple and constantly evolving factors.
A well-identified trend in DSS is to augment intelligent
features (learning, training, adaptation, possibility to choose
among available decisions) beyond simple information retriev-
ing, e.g., predicting the evolution of the current state situation,
known as situational awareness [9]. In intelligent DSS, human
cognition can impact the CI, and vice versa. That is, the
performance of the DSS depends on complicated factors such
as cognitive biases of humans and intelligent machines. This
is the area of our interest.
Typically, the DSS performance is evaluated in various
dimensions:
− Technical, e.g., false acceptance rate (FAR), false rejec-
tion rate (FRR), accuracy rate, and throughput [5], [10],
− Social, e.g., privacy, public acceptance [11],
− Psychological, e.g., efficiency of human-machine inter-
actions (known as teaming and trustworthy intelligent
systems) [12]–[14],
− Security, e.g., vulnerability and sensitivity of personal
data [11], [14], [15], and
− Efficiency of teamwork and group decision, e.g., trust,
risk, reliance, satisfaction, stress [16].
Risk, Trust, and Bias (R-T-B) are essential indicators of the
performance evaluation of complex dynamic systems such as
intelligent DSS (Fig. 1). The R-T-B measures belong to the
class of high-level performance measures. For example, trust
in the intelligent interview assistant addresses the intelligent
(cognitive) biases [15]. Risk and trust in the DSS are linked
to various kinds of biases, for example, racial biases in face-
based human identification [17], [18] and attribute biases in
social profiles [11].
Fig. 1: The R-T-B impact on the DSS performance and can
be used as precaution indicators. The complementary nature
of the R-T-B is the focus of our study.
As follows from Fig. 1, the role of the R-T-B measures
is twofold: performance regulators and precaution indicators.
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2Contemporary approaches often consider the R-T-B impact on
the DSS performance independently, ignoring their causal
relationships such as the risk of bias, the risk of trust, the risk
of trust over biases, etc. Adding to the evaluation level, the
R-T-B measures become precaution indicators or signs, e.g.,
high risk, low trust, large bias, and low risk of bias.
The complementary nature of the R-T-B measures in
biometric-enabled DSS is the focus of our study (Fig.
1). Specifically, R-T-B can manifest themselves as a causal
ensemble and convey additional useful information for DSS
performance regulation. For example, once a decision regard-
ing a subject’s identity is made, a “risk of decision trust” is
calculated that 1) assesses the risk of acceptance or rejection
of the decision based on the operator’s trust in the DSS, and 2)
acts as a measure of precaution on the over-trust. The working
hypothesis of our research is that the R-T-B landscape that
includes the causality between the R-T-B measures is evaluated
using causal networks. In this paper, we provide the results of
such study.
The remainder of this paper is organized as follows. Section
II provides a survey of the most important related works.
Contributions of this paper are provided in Section III. Our
approach to the R-T-B taxonomy is explained in Sections
IV, V, including the view on standardization of the R-T-B
measures using the Admiralty Code is proposed in Section
VII. The core mechanism of the R-T-B assessment on the
causal networks is explained in Section VI and demonstrated
through experiments in Section VIII. The forecast of emerging
applications and overall summary are provided in Sections IX
and X.
II. RELATED WORK
Performance measurement is commonly understood as a
regular measurement of a system’s outcomes that captures the
efficiency of said system. Measures such as privacy, customer
satisfaction, and public acceptance belong to a class of inte-
grated, or high-level system performance measures (Fig. 2).
Each of these measures includes a specific set of quantitative
and qualitative indicators, often complementary. For example,
− privacy includes indicators such as personal data (collec-
tion, storing, sharing, etc.);
− public acceptance includes security, privacy, user satis-
faction, etc.
− common indicators of privacy and public acceptance
measures include psychological predictors, social profile
factors, and demographic indicators.
In order to achieve the compatibility between systems
placed on a unified computational platform, it is reasonable
to extend these measures using the R-T-B indicators like “risk
of storing personal data”, “demographic bias”, and “trust of
social profiling”. Some of the R-T-B projections have been
studied in the last decade in a wide spectrum of applications,
for example, disclosure risks [11] (privacy losses in social
computing networks), biases in facial recognition [17], trust,
risk and optimism bias in e-government [19], risk of crime
and social trust in the presence of endogeneity bias [20]. In
[21], the notion of ‘biased trust’ addresses the phenomenon
Fig. 2: Typical integrated performance measures of the
biometric-enabled DSS are privacy and public acceptance.
of a small set of trusted network users. The adversary can
use this bias (prior trust relationships) for the development of
an attack strategy in onion-routing networks. In [22], risks of
decision-making biases and biases of the trustworthiness are
studied for various consumer scenarios. In [23], the trust of
reduced risk has been used for mobile shopping analysis.
The risk of bias in CI judgments is a key interest in all CI
applications, e.g., in medicine [24] (trust of machine decision)
and security [18] (risk of mis-identification due to “demo-
graphic” bias in facial recognition algorithms). Assessing the
trust of these phenomena for a given and novel CI algorithm
is of critical importance. Inappropriate calibration of trust in
human-machine and machine-machine interactions is a serious
problem, and when conjoined with bias, risks of various
kind of unwanted effects greatly intensifies. Among various
approaches, intelligent DSSs are of the greatest demand, e.g.,
risk-adaptive trust model [25].
Paper [26] is an introduction to the trust management
engine using pattern recognition techniques. The key notion
is the trust feature: “the desired feature to be taken into
consideration for a trust assessment”. Example of established
trust features include knowledge, reputation, and experience.
Trust assessment classes include “untrustworthy”, “neutrally
trusted”, and “trustworthy”. Next, the regulators (measures)
of trust discipline are the trust levels. The inputs of the
machine learning algorithms are the trust features in a certain
context, X = Context, some labels y(i), i = 1, 2, . . . ,m, are
assigned to each training set, {X, y(i)}. This is a formulation of
a trust assessment problem in terms of pattern recognition. In
particular, various opportunities for choosing an appropriate
machine learning algorithm are provided, e.g., multi-class
classifiers such as a deep learning network, or a support vector
machine that trains the model in order to identify the best
margin to separate the trustworthy interactions from the other
interactions. More details on trust computing using machine
learning algorithms are provided in [27]. In our opinion, the
approach proposed in [26], [27] can be extended to the broader
R-T-B spectrum.
The above review leads to the conclusion that neither
the R-T-B measures nor their causal relationships have been
systematically addressed so far. Our study aims at overcoming
these gaps and introduce the state-at-the-art R-T-B taxonomy
3and related cause-and-effects.
III. CONTRIBUTIONS
The foundation for the proposed taxonomy was laid in [28]
and [29]. In [28], risks of biases for facial recognition were
investigated, and in [29], risk and trust indicators of synthetic
data in cognitive security checkpoints were studied. The
quintessence of the experimental results from these sources
is analyzed in Section VIII. This paper takes these results
one step further by introducing a systematic approach to the
R-T-B causal performance evaluation of complex biometric-
enabled systems.
Our contribution and goal are achieved in conjunction
with the following results:
− Framework of intelligent DSS; we adopted Haykin’s
fundamental results on cognitive systems [30], in par-
ticular, in modeling the DSS for multi-state intelligent
checkpoint;
− Taxonomical view for causal R-T-B inference; we
adopted, for this purpose, Pearl’s layered causal infer-
ence hierarchy [31], as well as fundamentals of causal
(Bayesian) networks [32];
− Standardization the R-T-B measures; we referred to a
widely used in practice the Admiralty Code [33]–[35];
and
− Systematic view of advanced causal networks; we ex-
tended a recent review [36] that covers most of the causal
networks.
IV. BACKGROUND
This Section provides the basic knowledge of the intelligent
DSS over the R-T-B performance regulators.
A. Framework of intelligent DSS
Intelligent biometric-enabled DSS for identity management
is a complex dynamic system [15], [37] with the following
elements of a cognitive system [30] (Fig. 3):
Perception-action cycle that enables information gain regard-
ing the state of an identified person;
Memory distributed across the entire system (personal data
are collected in the physical and virtual world);
Attention is driven by memory to prioritize the allocation of
available resources; and
Intelligence is driven by perception, memories, and attention;
its function is to enable the control and decision-making
mechanism to help identify intelligent choices.
The R-T-B measures are an integrated part of the high-level
measurements used in intelligent systems, e.g., risk of person
identification in the perception-action cycle, privacy trust of
distributed memory, and attention bias. Intelligent DSS is a
semi-automated system, which deploys CI to process the data
sources and to assess R-T-B; this assessment is submitted to
a human operator for the final decision.
Fig. 3: Principle elements of the intelligent DSS.
B. The R-T-B definitions
Definition 1: Risk is a “measure of the extent to which
an entity is threatened by a potential circumstance or event,
and typically is a function of: (i) the adverse impact, also
called cost or magnitude of harm, that would arise if the
circumstance or event occurs, and (ii) the likelihood of event
occurrence” [38]. 
Formally, risk in this paper is defined as a function F of
impact (or consequences) of a circumstance or event and its
occurrence probability:
Risk = F (Impact, Probability)
For example, in automated decision making, the Risk is
expressed as an Impact of accepting the DSS decision
(which can be correct or incorrect) magnified by the likelihood
of its correctness or incorrectness.
For computational purpose of this paper, we adapt the
following definition of trust.
Definition 2: Trust as defined in [39], [40] is “the subjective
probability by which one entity (the trustor) expects that
another entity (the trustee) to perform a specific action of
which its goal is dependent on.” 
Useful details are provided in [41]: “trust is the attitude that
an agent (DSS in our case) will help achieve an individual’s
goals in a situation characterized by uncertainty and vulnera-
bility.”
From these definitions follows the key property of trust: the
level of trust is believed probability.
The framework of trust assessment includes the following
issues [12], [25], [41], [42]:
− The concept of trust is subjective by nature, its definition
depends on a particular area.
− In order to assess trust, it is reasonable to derive trust as
a function of risk.
− Trust is not necessarily proportional to the inverse of risk
because risk may exist even under a situation with high
trust.
− The balance between trust and risk can be achieved by
optimizing gains in decisions.
− In the presence of uncertainty, trust can provide a “credit”
to decisions made under uncertainty.
4In [43], trust is associated with the expected utility of the
decision, expressed in terms of cost of verification and cost
of the determined action. Trust in the currently preferred
decision on the action a is the probability P (a) that a is
successful. If trust is high enough, the currently preferred
action can be accepted without verification; however, the
operator will take risks for not performing verification. For
example, face matching (as binary decision) by an operator
aided with the DSS has only two options: Acceptance of the
DSS recommendation, or its Rejection. If the option Accept
is chosen, then the Trust in the DSS is simply the probability
that the Accept decision is correct
Trust = P (Accept)
and the user should accept the DSS recommendation without
verification if Trust > 1 − Cv/Ca where Cv is the cost of
decision verification action and Ca is the cost of incorrectly
accepting the DSS solution.
Definition 3: Trustworthiness as defined in [39], [40] is
“the objective probability by which the trustee performs a
given action on which the goal of trustor depends”. 
Useful details are given in [38]: “trustworthiness is the degree
to which a system can be expected to preserve the confi-
dentiality, integrity, and availability of the information being
processed, stored, or transmitted by the system across the full
range of threats.”
Hence, in contrast to trust, trustworthiness refers to the
actual probability by which the trusted party will perform as
expected.
Note that trust is a belief that does not necessarily require
observed behavior in the past, that is distinct from trustwor-
thiness, which is a verified objective of trust through observed
evidence. For example, a trusted biometric sample acquisition
system should satisfy a set of requirements such as resistance
to: 1) fake biometric target presentation, 2) communication
attack, and 3) acquisition system tampering. In [5], trustworthy
values are calculated using the accuracy rates (like FAR and
FRR) of different authentication modalities, that is, the higher
accuracy rate makes the modality more reliable.
Definition 4: Bias in the cognitive DSS refers to the
tendency of an assessment process to systematically over- or
under-estimate the value of a population parameter. 
For example, the bias of trust refers to a phenomenon that
is well identified in psychology. In our study, we consider
the bias of trust as the difference between the baseline trust
(Trust) and the trust given some prior knowledge on a
specific parameter of the system (Trust′):
BiasTrust = Trust− Trust′
The result can be positive (decreased trust) or negative (in-
creased trust).
Identifying and mitigating bias is essential for building
trust and estimating the risk of trust in human-machine and
machine-machine interactions. For example, the phenomenon
of own-race bias is well-known in psychology. It is a tendency
for systems to better recognize faces from one’s racial in-
group rather than for racial out-groups [13]. This tendency
was recently shown in face recognition experiments [17],
[18], [44]. CI biases were introduced by intelligent support of
human-machine interactions [15]. Identity management biases
were analyzed in multiple social profiles [11]. In [5], fuzzy
reasoning and intelligent adaptive selection of the Multi-Factor
Authentication (MFA) credentials have been used. Trustwor-
thiness value functions are used in different authentication
modalities such as biometrics, non-biometrics, and cognitive
behavior metric. Fuzzy DSS for MFA is a cognitive system
where a decision regarding user authentication is made itera-
tively and adaptively.
V. TAXONOMICAL VIEW ON THE CAUSAL R-T-B
INFERENCE
This section represents a crucial part of our approach.
The complementary nature of the R-T-B triad is a well-
known fact for researchers. Some of the R-T-B causal re-
lationships are successfully used in various fields (see our
review of related work in Section II). Gaps between the R-T-
B complementary nature and computational methodologies are
periodically reviewed [42], [45], standardized [46] and created
into guidelines [38]. The focus of our interest is motivated
by the improvement of the DSS performance using machine
learning techniques.
There are two questions we address: 1) the reflection of the
complementary nature of the R-T-B and 2) the need to close
the aforementioned gaps. The principal solution to the first
question is illustrated in Fig. 4. This R-T-B ensemble can be
ordered according to their appropriate discipline. For example,
first-order complement quantifies only single factor of the R-
T-B domain and is introduced by a single node (variable), e.g.,
risk R of event X = x. There are also second and third order
R-T-B complements.
Fig. 4: The R-T-B causal landscape.
The next step is more complicated and addresses the nature
of causal models [32]. Recent work by Pearl [31] is a
structured view on such model types.
Table I is Pearl’s original causal hierarchy table, provided
to explain our approach to the R-T-B causal taxonomy. Pearl’s
hierarchy is based on the rule: questions at level i, i ∈ {1, 2, 3}
can only be answered if information from level j ∈ {j ≥ i}
is available. There are three levels:
1) Association (low level); it invokes purely statistical re-
lationships and require no causal information; formally,
5it is the conditional probability of event Y = y given
event X = x, i.e., P (y|x) = p;
2) Intervention (intermediate level); it involves not just
seeing what is, but changing what we see; formally, it is
the probability of event Y = y given that we intervene
and set the value X to x and subsequently observe event
Z = z, i.e., P (y|do(x);
3) Counterfactuals (top level); a mode of necessitating ret-
rospective reasoning; formally, the probability of event
Y = y would be observed had X been x, given that
actually observed X to be x′ and Y to be y′.
TABLE I: The three-layer causal inference hierarchy based on
[31].
Level Activity Typical question
I.
Association
P (y|x)
Seeing
What is? How would
seeing X change my be-
lief in Y ?
II.
Intervention
P (y|do(x), z)
Doing
Intervening
What if?
What if I do X?
III.
Counterfactuals
P (yx|x′, y′)
Imagining,
Retrospection
Why? Was it X that
caused Y ? What if I had
acted differently?
Table II together with Fig. 4 provide the R-T-B taxonomical
view on the intelligent DSS. Three kinds of ensembles are
distinguished in the R-T-B space:
1st order: The R-T-B ensemble represents the simplest
(idealized) scenarios of performance regulators, e.g., risk as-
sessment, R, ignoring trust and bias factors.
2nd order: The R-T-B ensemble reflects the simplest causal
relationships, that is, knowledge about the 1st order ensemble,
e.g., risk caused by trust R(T ).
3rd order: The R-T-B ensemble contains knowledge about
the 2nd order ensemble, e.g., risk of trust in the presence of
bias, R(T |B). For example, in [20], the risk of crime has been
studied over social trust in the presence of expected biased
parameter estimates. Note that the 3rd order R-T-B include
T (B|R), T (R|B), B(T |R), and B(R|T ).
In [47], trust is derived from experience while assuming
multiple “sources” of trust in a system. The fusion of trusted
sources represented by Beta-distributions is performed using
copula technique resulting in a joint probability distribution
of the overall trust. Paper [47] then proposes a method for
risk forecasting based on a trust model using a mix of Beta-
distributions. It takes positive or negative security incident
indications as an input and compiles a numerical value within
[0,1] that models the probability of system failure, conditional
on the recorded experience. The trust model is updated in
a Bayesian fashion, making the trust measure a conditional
expectation of a security indicator, based on prior experience.
Summarizing, Table II outlines a causal R-T-B relationships.
These can be inferred using various types of causal graph
models, a brief guide to which is provided in the next Section.
VI. SYSTEMATIC VIEW OF ADVANCED CAUSAL NETWORKS
The crucial requirement for the R-T-B formalization is the
ability to reason about the R-T-B state as well as the R-T-B
prediction. Specifically, the following conditional dependen-
cies can be derived from the R-T-B causal landscape in Fig.
4:
(a) Given the bias B, assess/predict the risk of trust R(T |B)
and trust of risk T (R|B);
(b) Given the trust T , assess/predict the risk of bias R(B|T )
and bias of risk B(R|T );
(c) Given the risk R, assess/predict the trust of bias T (B|R)
and bias of trust B(T |R).
A causal network is a directed acyclic graph where each
node denotes a unique random variable. A directed edge from
node n1 to node n2 indicates that the value attained by n1 has a
direct causal influence on the value attained by n2. Uncertainty
inference requires a specific type of data structures referred to
as Conditional Uncertainty Tables (CUTs). A CUT is assigned
to each node in the causal network. Given a node n, the CUT
assigned to n is a table that is indexed by all possible value
assignments according to the parent nodes of n. Each entry
of the table is a conditional “uncertainty model” that varies
according to the choice of the uncertainty metric.
Analysis of a causal network is out of the scope of this
paper. However, we introduce in this paper the systematic
criteria for choosing the appropriate computational tools. In
addition, some details are clarified in our experimental study.
The following types of causal networks are deployed in
contemporary machine reasoning based on the CUT criterion:
Causal
network
≡

Bayesian CUT≡CPT [32];
Imprecise CUT≡CImT [50];
Interval CUT≡CInT [51];
Credal CUT≡CCT [52];
DS CUT≡CDST [53];
Fuzzy CUT≡CFT [54];
Subjective CUT≡CST [55];

(1)
In the list (1), the following abbreviations are used:
CPT – Conditional Probability Table;
CImT – Conditional Imprecise Table;
CInT – Conditional Interval Table;
CCT – Conditional Credal Table;
CDST – Conditional Dempster-Shafer (DS) Table;
CST – Conditional Subjective Table.
The distinguishing feature of these CUTs is that the uncer-
tainty is interpreted in different ways. For example, uncertainty
in risk assessment can be “filled” by weighted compositions of
costs of losses, or by a set of alternative decisions. The type of
a causal network shall be chosen given the DSS model and a
specific scenario. The choice depends on the CUT as a carrier
of primary knowledge and as appropriate to the scenario:
Bayesian network is defined as a causal network with the
CUT being CPT using point probability measures [31].
The key limiting factor is the assumption that modeled
events are independent.
Imprecise causal network is defined by using the CUT type
such as the CImT, using lower and upper probabilities
p(A) and p(A), respectively [50].
6TABLE II: The R-T-B taxonomy based on Pearl’s causal inference hierarchy [31]
The R-T-B causal inference Graph
I. First order R-T-B
Risk R: Risk of event X = x, Risk= F(Impact, Probability X = x)
Trust T : Trust for event X = x
Bias B: Bias of event X = x
II. Second order R-T-B
Risk←Trust:
− Association R(x|t): Risk of event X = x given that trust T = t is observed;
− Intervention R(x|do(t, x): Risk of event X = x given that we intervene and
set the value of trust T = t and subsequently observe event Z = z;
− Counterfactuals R(xt|t′, x′): Risk of event X = x would be observed had X
been x, given that we actually observed X to be x′ and trust T to be t′
Risk←Bias:
Association R(x|b); Intervention R(x|do(b), x); Counterfactuals R(xb|b′, x′)
Trust←Bias:
Association T (x|b); Intervention T (x|do(b), x); Counterfactuals T (xb|b′, x′)
Trust←Risk:
Association T (x|r); Intervention T (x|do(r), x); Counterfactuals T (xr|r′, x′)
Bias←Risk:
Association B(x|r); Intervention B(x|do(r), x); Counterfactuals B(xr|r′, x′)
Bias←Trust:
Association B(x|t); Intervention B(x|do(t), x); Counterfactuals B(xt|t′, x′)
III. Third order R-T-B
Bias→Risk←Trust:
Association R(x|b, t); Intervention R(x|do(b, t), x);
Counterfactuals R(xb,t|b′, t′, x′)
Bias→Trust←Risk:
Association T (x|b, r); Intervention T (x|do(b, r), x);
Counterfactuals T (xb,r|b′, r′, x′)
Trust→Bias←Risk:
Association B(x|t, r); Intervention B(x|do(t, r), x);
Counterfactuals B(xt,r|t′, r′, x′)
Interval causal network is defined by the specification of the
CUT as the CInT and probability interval using a “radius
of uncertainty” for each point probability [51].
Credal causal network is defined by specifying the CUT as
the CCT using closed intervals of the possible range of
probability values [52]; this model can be viewed as a
set of Bayesian networks that share the same graphical
structure but are associated with different conditional
probability parameters.
Dempster-Shafer (DS) causal network is defined by using the
CDST that utilizes the formalization of imprecise prob-
abilities for evaluating the quality of results, producing
optimistic and pessimistic estimations of vulnerability via
plausibility and belief measures [53].
Fuzzy causal network is defined by specifying the CFT using
fuzzy measures [54]. The CFTs are similar to CInT, but
the lower and upper bounds may be “soft”.
Subjective causal network is defined by specifying the CUT
as the CST using subjective opinions, a belief-and-
uncertainty representation of an unknown probability
distribution of a random variable [55].
The choice of a specific causal network model is heavily
dependent on the data that is available for creating the CUTs,
as well as the information that is expected to be given by
the posterior uncertainty model. For instance, if statistical
data is in abundance, probability theory will be the most
suitable choice of uncertainty model and will provide the most
informative results. If statistical data is lacking for certain
variables, probability intervals can account for uncertainty
in those probabilities for which there is insufficient data. If
7statistical data is almost completely lacking, DS theory may
be appropriate and the expert can provide the DS weights to
populate the CDSTs.
Note that specific biases can be observed in reasoning using
causal networks, such as endogeneity bias. Endogeneity occurs
when an omitted variable or a variable’s value confounds
the relationship between cause and effect, thereby introducing
bias into the estimate of the causal effect and reasoning
mechanism. In statistical terms, the endogeneity of a given
variable manifests itself as an association between the variable
and the error term. For example, in [20], the societal R-
T-B assessments have been considered with respect to the
endogeneity bias.
There were several attempts to provide researchers with the
“Guidelines” for choosing the best causal network platform
based on the CUT. A recent review [36] covers most of the
network types in list (1). Comparison of causal computational
platforms for modeling various systems is a useful strategy,
such as Dempster-Shafer vs. credal networks [56], Bayesian
vs. interval vs. Dempster-Shafer vs. fuzzy networks [37], [48].
R-T-B reasoning is the ability to form an intelligent judg-
ment using the R-T-B data. It is a judgment under uncertainty
based on a causal network. For example, in [57], the notion of
trust is closely connected to the notion of belief change. Trust
is defined in terms of a trust partition over a set of belief
states, and the belief is updated based on the trust-sensitive
belief revision operators.
VII. STANDARDIZATION OF THE R-T-B MEASURES USING
ADMIRALTY CODE
R-T-B and their causal relationships manifest themselves in
intelligent DSS in different ways, such as the reliability of in-
formation (data) sources and the credibility of the information
(data):
Source Reliability︸ ︷︷ ︸
Quality
⇔
 RiskTrustBias
⇔ Data Credibility︸ ︷︷ ︸
Reputation
The relationship can be represented as follows:
(a) Source reliability as the quality of being reliable, or
trustworthy, is related to 1) risk as a function of potential
adverse impact and the likelihood of occurrence, 2) trust
as the confidence in quality, as well as their causal
relationships, and 3) bias as systematic over- or under-
assessment of the parameter of interest.
(b) Information (data) credibility as the reputation impacting
one’s ability to be believed.
In [48], available resources and information for traveler
profiling are rated accordingly to the Admiralty Code (Fig.
6). NATO Standardization Agreements such as STANAG 2022
and STANAG 2511 [33]–[35] use the Admiralty Code to re-
solve conflicting scenarios in human-human, human-machine,
and machine-machine interactions. In [35], information trust
is defined based on well-formalized reliability and credibility
attributes.
The reliability of the decision support provided by the DSS
can be increased by using more reliable sources and credible
information or can be diminished due to lowered reliability of
the source and/or credibility of the information. In this context,
trust can be expressed in terms of the reliability of data sources
and/or the credibility of prior information. For example, sce-
nario F6 is composed of the source reliability F≡ <Cannot
be judged> and information credibility 6≡ <Cannot be
judged>.
There are various ways to use the Admiralty Code standard.
For example, notion “credibility” is equivalent to “trustwor-
thiness” over “expertise” where “trustworthiness” represents a
fused reliability of source and credibility of data.
Fig. 6 explains the decision support mechanism for assess-
ing different scenarios in terms of system states. For exam-
ple, given the states {S1, S2, . . . , S8} of the epidemiological
surveillance, the DSS analyzes the states according to the
Admiralty Code resulting in the following decision-making
landscape:
− States S1 and S8; S2 and S7 can be used for decision-
making;
− Decision-making based on states S3, S4, and S5; S6 is
very risky.
Fig. 5: Manifestation of the R-T-B via assessments of reliabil-
ity of source and credibility of information using the Admiralty
Code.

1 2 3 4 5 6
A S2,7
B
C S1,8 S3,4,5
D
E S6
F

Fig. 6: Example of the R-T-B reasoning. Given a set of a
system states S = Si, i = 1, 2, . . . , 8. The primary task
of the DSS is the R-T-B reasoning about these states using
available resources such as the Admiralty code. The result
is a set system states provided to a human analyst/expert to
support their decision-making.
For security checkpoints, the source reliability and informa-
tion credibility are represented by the probabilistic variables
8such as false ID, multiple ID of the same person, and features
of intentional data alteration in the chip (e.g., biometric traits
and text data), as well as a false life-cycle history [11], [49].
VIII. DEMONSTRATIVE EXPERIMENTS
The goal of this section is to demonstrate how the R-T-B
concept works in real-world large scale tasks, and through this
method, empirically prove that the R-T-B triad is a system
performance regulator. For this, a typical biometric-enabled
complex dynamic system was chosen. Two research questions
was prioritized for investigation in the R-T-B dimensions:
− Impact of synthetic data on system performance; this
problem is motivated, in particular, by research [58], [59];
− Impact of demographic factors on system performance;
this problem is critical in facial recognition [17], [18].
A. The R-T-B of synthetic data
Experimental study of synthetic data impact on performance
of a cognitive checkpoint is reported in [29]. Below, we briefly
introduce the quintessence of this report and provide new
projections.
1) Problem: Synthetic data often replaces authentic data
or is used together with the latter. They are an essential part
of modeling and training various components of a check-
point. Synthetic biometric traits are a class of algorithmically
generated biometric, non-biometric, and cognitive behavior
authentication credentials (e.g., face and facial expressions,
fingerprints, voice, gait, user name, password, ) used as a
source for constructing a human profile for identity manage-
ment [60].
2) Multi-state screening model: We consider a multi-state
screening in the dynamic cognitive system that (Fig. 7):
1) Monitors the traveler data throughout the process of e-
ID checking, face recognition, and continuously assess
the R-T-B using various sources such as behavioral
biometrics, watchlist, and CI decision assistant results;
2) Updates its states based on the intelligence gathered
via human-machine interactions (CI decision assistant),
the results of the biometric traits recognition based on
machine learning, the results of the concealed object
detection (by adjusting radar illumination), and others.
In Fig. 7, the traveler’s identity management process is
implemented in three states, S1 (ID validation), S2 (Traveler
authentication), and S3 (Concealed object detection). Each
state Si and sub-state is a part of the ‘Layered Security
Strategy’, a contemporary security doctrine [61]. Each state
Si and sub-state generates the R-T-B assessments for further
processing. Inference using operations such as propagation,
causal analysis, and reasoning can also be applied to the R-T-
B assessments.
Because R-T-B are measured as probability events, they can
be combined using propagation and fusion techniques. Syn-
thetic data is required at various CI operations and processes.
For example, the sub-state S(1)m of state Sm is defined under
learnt ID source reliability using authentic data from previous
experience, while the potential attack data can be synthesized.
This enables assessment of the R-T-B of such rare events
(attacks).
Fig. 7: The taxonomical view of the multi-state intelligent
identity management process. The R-T-B of synthetic data is
assessed considering their causal relationships with authentic
data. Each state is represented by a perception-action cycle of
sub-states.
3) Formalization accordingly the Admiralty Code: Con-
sider a typical real-world scenario of the ID management
process: Given an e-ID, assess the ID information credibility.
At the descriptive level of the Admiralty Code, this scenario
is represented as (Section VII):
<Credibility> ≡ <Trustworthiness> +<Expertise>
where <Trustworthiness> manifests itself as
Trustworthiness ≡
 Source Reliability+
Data Credibility
4) Causal network: Assessment of the ID information
credibility is represented in Fig. 8 in the form of a Bayesian
network and the corresponding CPTs are as follows:
Node ‘ID source reliability’ denotes the three reliability levels
of the e-passport/ID authentication, which depends on
many risk factors such as the country of issue, the number
of defence levels in the document, the life cycle history,
the type of chip, the type of biometric modality, the type
of encryption, and the type of RFID mechanism.
Node ‘Valid ID’, or ‘Trusted ID’ denotes whether the e-
passport ID should pass the validation procedure us-
ing factors such as watermarks, holograms, ultraviolet
threads, micro text, and optical variable ink.
Node ‘ID validation’ denotes the outcome of the authentication
process of the e-passport.
Node ‘ID credibility’ describes the three credibility level of
the outcome of the validation process. If the credibility of
the validation process is known as a priori, it can be used
to compute the posterior beliefs related to the validity of
the individual document (node V ).
9Fig. 8: Assessment of the ID credibility (trustworthiness and
expertise) using an IV-echelon (state) identity management
scenario and its implementation. Synthetic data impact is
incorporated using the CPTs of the nodes R and V .
5) Scenario and reasoning example: Consider the follow-
ing particular scenario: IF the reliability of the ID source is
known to be ‘low’ and the resulting credibility is ‘high’,
THEN what is the posterior probability that the ID is valid?
This scenario models a situation of conflict where an unreliable
source produces a credible outcome. It is very likely that the ID
was valid. That is, the trustworthiness of the statement ‘the ID
was valid’ is coherent with the expert knowledge (incorporated
in the algorithms) [29].
6) Synthetic data risks: Let us assume that to train algo-
rithms for validating ID (node V ) and identifying ID source
reliability (node R), synthetic data was used to represent rare
events, such as false ID, multiple ID of the same person,
and features of intentional data alteration in the chip (e.g.,
biometric traits and text data) as well as a false life cycle
history. Probabilities of these threats are represented by the
CPTs for nodes V and R. There is always a risk that the
validation algorithm makes a mistake should the real rare
event occur. For example, features of the forged e-ID are not
detected, or these features can be mistakenly detected in a
valid ID. The goal is to assess these risks caused by the usage
of synthetic data.
It is well understood that the frequency of object occurrence
in the identity management process follows a long-tailed
distribution. For example, people with true IDs and expired
IDs are much more common than people with false IDs and
multiple IDs. This problem relates the novelty detection, also
known as anomaly detection, or one-class classification, the
task of recognizing that the test data differ in some respect
from the data that are available during training [62]. The tailed
probability distributions have been used, for example, in the
study of cyber-risks such as ID theft [63].
B. Bias ensemble in facial recognition
There are three phases of bias analysis in the DSS: 1) Bias
identification, e.g., what kind of biases are manifested in a
system? 2) Bias assessment, e.g., a unified metric for different
kinds of biases, such as the risk of bias; and 3) Bias operation,
e.g., the fusion of risks of biases.
1) Problem: The traveler’s identity management process is
implemented as a process that goes through multiple states
[15], [37]. Each state is characterized by a specific bias such as
the bias in face recognition. Statistics of these biases are being
used for machine learning. These biases are mostly represented
by the tails of the probability distributions. A unified metric
of bias that we consider in this study is the risk of bias and
the related trust in the technology that is biased.
Our experiment addresses multiple biases in a cognitive se-
curity checkpoint such as “ID Reliability Bias”, “ID Validation
Bias”, and “Trustworthiness Bias”. Among various candidates
of biases, we consider specifically “Face Recognition Bias”.
Few results on demographic bias in facial recognition have
been recently reported, in particular, in [17], [18], [44]. The
experimental details are described in [28], which aims to
highlight the practical details of assessing an ensemble of
biases.
2) Causal model: The causal network shown in Fig. 9
describes how the quality of facial recognition can be com-
promised by the various facial attributes that are “biased”
based on the year-of-birth (YOB) Y , gender D, ethnicity E,
mustache H , beard B, and glasses S. The parent nodes to
the “Correctness” node represents the bias attributed to face
recognition. The “Correctness” node presents the probability
of the neural network in predicting a positive (genuine subject)
or negative (imposter) identity, whereas the “Match” node
determines whether the positive or negative prediction matches
the ground truth label.
Fig. 9: A simplified causal network of biases in facial recog-
nition. Risk is derived based on the results of the “Match”,
and Trust is affected by the Operator’s Bias.
3) Formalization: Risk of error in the decision due to
bias is estimated as Risk= F(Impact, Probability)
which relates to the error rates of the system, specifically the
false non-match rate (FNMR) and false match rate (FMR).
In addition, the risk value is associated with the probability
of a random user being genuine given a particular bias
P(Genuine|Bias). At a high level of abstraction (e.g.,
ignoring metric and dependencies), the risk given a particular
bias RiskBias is defined as follows:
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RiskBias = ImpactFMR︸ ︷︷ ︸
Cost of a FMR
×FMRBias × (1− P(Genuine|Bias))
+ ImpactFNMR︸ ︷︷ ︸
Cost of a FNMR
×FNMRBias × P(Genuine|Bias)
For example, given the scenario of a security checkpoint, the
FMR is related to a wrongly granted access, while the FNMR
contributes to travelers’ inconvenience. The impact of the FMR
is a breach of security which, given this scenario, should
have a high impact. The impact of the FNMR is a negative
user experience, which is of a lower impact. Based on this
scenario, we assign a 10:1 impact ratio and a 90% genuine user
probability, that is ImpactFMR = 10, ImpactFNMR = 1,
P(Genuine|Bias) = 0.9. Given the YOB attribute, the
risk for individuals born in the 1930s is computed as follows:
10× 0.0208× 0.1 + 1× 0.0012× 0.9 = 0.02188 .
The ensemble risk bias in identifying (matching) a particular
individual RiskBias(Ensemble) is assessed as the sum of
the risk biases according to his/her attributes:
RiskBias(Ensemble) =
N∑
Bias=1
RiskBias (2)
where Bias represents one of the attributes, Y,D,E,H,B, and
S in Fig. 9, N = 6.
4) Experimental results: For this experiment, we demon-
strate biases using the FERET face database that contains
a total of 14,126 images of 1199 subjects [64]. The typical
performance measure for face recognition includes accuracy,
FNMR, and FMR. The features used for face identification
is extracted using a pre-trained Resnet50 convolutional neural
network.
The numerical results are presented in detail in [28]. The
identified biases include gender, year-of-birth, ethnicity, and
facial attributes (glasses, beard, and mustache). The causal
relationship between the biases and face recognition accuracy
is represented by the causal network shown in Fig. 9. A
significant bias in face recognition accuracy was observed
with respect to the year-of-birth: the accuracy decreased by
17.65% between those born in the 1920s and the 1980s.
IX. FORECAST OF EMERGING APPLICATIONS
Results of our work are common among processes that can
be modeled based on the principles of complex dynamic sys-
tems, e.g., learning, teaching, observation, conflict resolving,
proactive computations, and countermeasures in real world and
cyberspace. Below we introduce several emerging DSS over
R-T-B applications:
− Epidemiological surveillance [7], [65]–[67];
− DSS for autonomy systems [68], [69];
− Combat DSS [16], [70], [71];
− Ambient DSS [72];
− E-coaching [3], [73].
These and other potential applications are based on the concept
of group decision-making [74], [75]. Given an evidence and
N experts, each expert is supported by the DSS to make a
group decision (illustrated in Fig. 10).
Fig. 10: The framework of the DSS emerging applications over
the R-T-B measures: human-machine using the DSS. The Final
decision is the consensus of each expert’s decision supported
by the consensus of the DSS.
1) Epidemiological surveillance: Epidemiological surveil-
lance experts (healthcare, first response, transportation, edu-
cation, business and communication, media, security, police,
etc.) need a near real-time, accurate picture of the extent and
patterns of disease transmission at the community-level. Each
expert in a specific field needs an intelligent DSS in order to
better understand current and evolving healthcare demands,
in order to be able to make low-risk, time-sensitive rapid
decisions over various kinds of biases related, for example,
on how to allocate limited and/or secure additional resources
and how to relax mitigation efforts [76]. Part of these tasks
uses biometrics, e.g., body vitals monitoring including thermal
patterns, as well as personal protective equipment (PPE)
detection and PPE-wearing person identification.
A recent survey on Covid-19 pandemic [65] covers
decision-making support in many projections such as data-
driving modeling, testing, tracing contacts, benchmarks, data
hubs, machine learning, and privacy.
In [66], reasoning mechanism using a Bayesian causal
network is used for studying collider bias of Covid-19 disease
risk and severity. In causal networks, a variable is a collider
when it is causally influenced by two or more variables; this
results in either over-estimation or under-estimation of causal
effects. Paper [66] also indicates potential Covid-19 collider
biases caused by blood type, demographic factors, and related
diseases. In [7], the DSS concept is implemented as causal
reasoning on contact tracing to reduce the Covid-19 spread
by providing diagnostic-oriented feedback (user symptoms)
to citizens with near real-time Covid-19 surveillance, as well
as an accurate picture of the extent and patterns of disease
transmission at the community-level for a constantly changing
situation. Authors discuss various privacy risk mitigation ap-
proaches, public compliance, and trust. Causal reasoning upon
the infection prevalence and fatality rates is used in [67].
2) DSS for autonomous systems: According to the taxo-
nomical view in [68], the prevalent types of the algorithmic
biases in autonomous systems include training data bias,
algorithmic focus and processing biases, transfer context bias,
and interpretation bias. Responses to the algorithmic bias,
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in particular, include identifying and intervening problematic
biases. A related bias is known as the artificial intelligence
bias [77]. Paper [69] addresses the mitigation of the various
kinds of biases in autonomous systems using the concept of
human-machine trust repair, described as a certain act that
makes trust more positive. This is the same kind of action as
a feedback loop in a cognitive DSS.
3) Combat DSS: Contemporary military combat teams in-
clude both soldiers and autonomous robots [16]. Situational
awareness tasks for each soldier are supported in combat by
a biometric-enabled, wearable DSS, e.g., stress and fatigue
detector [70], [71]. This addresses the problem of individual
effects of stress (cognitive, emotional, behavioral, and physi-
ological) and team effect of stress such as decreased cooper-
ation, ineffective communication, and decreased coordination.
Decision-making in such a unit is radically different from
a human-only team, since in a human-robot team, a portion
of the responsibility is delegated to the intelligent machines.
Rapid trust calibration becomes a task of high priority [78].
This problem formulation is known as a human-CI teaming
situational awareness [79].
4) Ambient systems: Ambient adaptive systems such as
ambient CI assistants or monitors of human occupant vi-
tals/biometrics have to use mechanisms to regulate themselves
and change their structure in order to operate efficiently within
dynamic ubiquitous computing environments. As a conse-
quence of the increasingly aging population, it is necessary
to find solutions to improve the living condition and develop
more robust, usable, safe, and low-cost healthcare systems.
This leads to a fixed DSS to be incorporated in ambient
systems such as smart home, mobility and health assistants
[72].
5) E-coaching: E-coaching systems are aimed at supporting
individuals in their self-regulation [73] using various bio-
metrics. E-coaching offers support in the following areas:
social ability, credibility, context-awareness, personalization
(user tailoring), learning of user behavior, proactiveness, and
guidance (coaching planning) [3], [73]. Measures of efficiency
in such systems can naturally be expressed in terms of R-T-B.
X. CONCLUSIONS
Biometric-enabled systems are becoming an integral part
of more complex intelligent systems. Such system-to-system
embedding requires a deep unification of computational plat-
forms and performance regulators. The proposed approach in
this study use R-T-B as DSS performance indicators. These
indicators shall become a mandatory assessment tool for
all stages of the DSS development and deployment for the
following reasons:
1) The R-T-B causal-based taxonomy provides efficient
resources for deriving the knowledge (from biometrics)
required for decision-making in biometric-enabled sys-
tems.
2) The DSS core, the reasoning over the R-T-B projec-
tion is implemented using causal networks (including
Bayesian); each of these network types provides specific
interpretation and approximation of uncertainty stemmed
from the nature of biometric data.
3) The DSS with R-T-B indicators are most appropriate
for forecasting applications, including risk assessment
in the biometric-enabled systems that are planned to
be implemented given the specific security, privacy, and
usability scenarios.
From a practical standpoint, the R-T-B indicators are useful
performance evaluation tools in any biometric-enabled system.
From a theoretical standpoint, measuring the R-T-B is an
ultimate probabilistic and computational intelligent problem
because it aims at the development of a proactive mechanism
to detect ill-defined phenomena from observable data. The
problem is extremely challenging because the R-T-B are
conceptual constructs (often psychological indicators) that are
not directly observable and are computed from the multiple
sources of factors embedded in a noisy context within a
system operation. Among various challenges, we emphasize
that consensus methodology for the group DSS is an open
problem (Fig. 10).
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